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ONE BRIDGE, TWO TOWNS AND THREE COUNTRIES:
ANTICIPATORY GEOPOLITICS IN THE GREATER
MEKONG SUBREGION

The proposed bridge between Chiang Khong and Houay Xay will form the
remaining crucial link of the Asian Highway 3, connecting Bangkok to
Kunming, a project highly anticipated in the Greater Mekong Subregion’s
(GMS) development. With China funding half the cost of the bridge, it
signifies a strong player in the economic borderland. The article seeks to
uncover the locals’ thoughts and feelings of the bridge to raise awareness of
‘voices’ from the Thai-Lao border in relation to the further destinations the
bridge will serve. The local perceptions of the proposed bridge are used to
provide a form of comprehension of anticipatory cross-border geopolitical
relations between the Thai-Lao border and China. Drawing on the concepts
of critical geopolitics, anti-geopolitics and geoeconomics, it concludes by
underscoring the need to listen to local perceptions at the Thai-Lao border as
they signal potential ill-feelings that could jeopardize future cross-border
geopolitical ties and trade.
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INTRODUCTION- ONE BRIDGE, TWO TOWNS AND THREE COUNTRIES
This is about places in the upper-Mekong borderlands and about the people who
create and regulate commercial linkages between those places. My journeys through
these places started- and finished- in the northern Thai town of Chiang Khong, a
busy trading centre on the Mekong River border with Laos. … It was an ideal
location to observe the regulation of trade and cross-border passage.1

In his book The Legend of the Golden Boat, anthropologist Andrew Walker highlights an
active cross-border trading zone in Chiang Khong (northern Thailand) and Houay Xay
(northwestern Laos) in the upper Mekong River. Walker also alerts us to the visionary of
an economic borderland called the “Upper Mekong Economic Quadrangle” which
includes the two places mentioned above along with northeastern Burma and
southwestern China (Yunnan Province).2 Slightly more than a decade has passed since
Walker wrote the book. The visionary of an economic borderland encompassing
mainland Southeast Asia and southwestern China still persists, albeit at a greater
intensity. Over the years, in a bid to link northern Thailand and northwestern Laos better
with Yunnan Province in China, new roads have been built and existing ones improved in
the three countries.3 Currently, what is crucially lacking is a completed bridge connecting
the towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay to achieve the goal of the visionary. Hence,
our paper seeks to focus on the fourth Thai-Lao friendship bridge in construction at the
border towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay.4 The proposed 480m long bridge will
form the remaining crucial link of the Asian Highway 3. It will connect Bangkok, and
potentially from faraway Singapore via the Malaysian peninsula to Kunming on an
1800km long journey (see Figures 1, 2 and 3), a project which the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) envisages for the Greater Mekong Subregion’s (GMS) development.5 China
and Thailand will each share half of the total cost of the bridge over a sum close to two
billion baht (approximately 63 million USD), which is probably an underestimate as costs
of materials and construction are increasing.6
***********
Figure 1 here, Caption: Economic Corridors in the Greater Mekong Subregion
***********
***********
Figure 2 here, Caption: Northwestern Laos and Northern Thailand
***********
***********
Figure 3 here, Caption: Constructing a Bridge, Completing the Corridor (January 2012)
***********
The purpose of this particular fourth bridge over the Mekong River goes far
beyond connecting two points of the Thai-Lao border. As James Sidaway observes, transfrontier bridges are also, metaphorical spaces: serving variously the visions of state
leaders, regional and provincial planners, and all manner of other agents viewing
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potential closer cross-border ties, linking trans-national places, and allowing for new
spaces for further investment.7 A bridge that connects two towns but serves the interests
of three states across regional boundaries holds huge geopolitical symbolism for the
proponents of the GMS. However, in very material ways, the bridge can be viewed as
one part of a much bigger regional process within the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
promoted GMS process, primarily creating new investment opportunities for ‘scale
jumping’ capital, aiding easier and cheaper access to cross-border resources, through
alliances between state bodies and transnational capital operating mostly outside of the
local borderlands. As Jim Glassman has argued convincingly the ‘GMS is worth
understanding for those of us living outside of it as an integral part in which processes of
“globalization” and “regionalization” are occurring … the GMS can serve as a true
metaphor for the world in which we all live’.8
In our research area the proposed bridge encapsulates and represents important
dimensions of a process of ‘building the GMS’ by completing the ‘final piece of the
jigsaw puzzle’ to allow one travel seamlessly on road from Singapore to China in future,
thus projecting out an enlarged area of economic opportunity. This particular cross
border bridge’s development in its metaphorical sense draws us to the ‘understanding of
borders is not so much their material morphology, but the various forms of interpretation
and representation that they embody’.9 With China funding half the cost of the bridge, it
not only speaks of China’s interest in the Thai-Lao border towns of Chiang Khong and
Houay Xay, but also signifies China’s southern regional thrust into the political economic
borderlands of mainland Southeast Asia. In addition, we recognize the potential geoeconomic transformations that may arise, including deepening socio-economic
disparities, which may benefit some borderland agents but marginalize others. Thus, we
argue that further grounded research is necessary to appreciate how such cross-border
developments play out in the actual borderlands. The bridge project is already opening up
new scales of economic activity, as Bangkok and Chinese investors are speculatively
buying up land near to the project. Undoubtedly there will be socio-economic and
geopolitical ramifications at the scale of the local borderlands, thus we are concerned
with anticipatory geographies.
Our anticipatory geographies are future-oriented modes of visioning a place’s
(re)development, encompassing a material force that has important practical
consequences.10 Anticipatory geographies about an envisioned future is also closely tied
to imaginative geographies, meaning the representations that (re)development in
economic borderlands are suggestive of, and the visualizations behind these. Derek
Gregory has examined imaginative geographies as functions to the unexamined
assumptions of space and spatial relations, which serve to frame diverse geographical
phenomenon in political discourses.11 What could be anticipatory and imaginary in nature
requires some ethnographic details, and in this paper we are primarily concerned about
what borderland residents have to say about the bridge development and some of the
changes it may bring. Hence, we unpack the expectations and perceptions of
(re)developing an economic borderland, specifically (in our research) from people who
live in the border towns, where their livelihoods are most likely to experience changes
given the physical transformations to the landscape and flows of people and goods by the
proposed bridge being most evident at the border. The anticipatory geographies’ focus
then serves as a device to highlight the importance of local perceptions from Thai-Lao
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border of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay to approach the heart of the subject matter- the
anticipatory transnational cross-border relationship between the Thai-Lao border and
China arising from the bridge. In other words, this means a study of anticipatory
geopolitical relations at the scale of the borderlands.
The next two sections of the paper provide a review of (re)development of
economic borderlands in relation to our conceptual debates on anticipatory geographies
and anticipatory geopolitics, and some specific earlier socio-economic accounts of the
Mekong borderlands for its empirical relevance. We also strongly believe in the salience
of grounded political geography fieldwork as one strategy to examine broader
geopolitical and geoeconomic issues, which are highlighted in our research
methodologies. This relates to calls for ‘a more geographical geopolitics’, and supports
those who advocate ethnographic methods, used alongside others, as ‘a helpful tool to
build up a fuller understanding of geopolitics and international relations’.12 As will be
apparent, the local perceptions gathered reflect differing views compared with the
governments involved in the megaproject, and in some cases, revealing localized
anxieties toward livelihood challenges posed by the proposed bridge. In the light of these
observations, we argue that the Thai and Lao central governments should seriously
engage with borderlands residents and address the local concerns of people living in the
border towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay, particularly as there are anxieties about
the rapidly growing extra-territorial influence of China’s economy, migrants and trade
within the GMS borderlands.
ANTICIPATORY GEOGRAPHIES, ANTICIPATORY GEOPOLITICS AND
ECONOMIC BORDERLANDS
Over the last two decades, economic borderlands receive great attention from
geographers in the backdrop of a so called ‘borderless’ world.13 However, this
‘borderless’ world perception is highly misleading as economic borderlands and its
capital still function in multi-layered compartments determined by political boundaries.14
Economic borderlands do function in political boundaries that separate nation states, but
they do not necessarily restrict cross-border trade interactions. Some economic
borderlands consist of bustling cross-border towns and account for significant exchanges
of trade, labour and investment, which are taking place in several parts of the intensively
researched European Union border zones15, and the US-Mexico borderlands, such as
Tijuana (Mexico)/San Diego (USA)16, and Hong Kong/Shenzhen (China).17 Studies of
larger Asian economic borderlands include the Upper Mekong River region, which
encompasses the borderlands of northwestern Laos, northern Thailand, northeastern
Burma, and Southwestern China18, and the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth
Triangle.19 We recognize that previous and current works on economic borderlands have
done well to focus on getting insights from the borderlands to tease out the intensity and
extent to which (re)development projects affect people on both sides of the border. To
provide an example, we refer to the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle.
Grundy-Warr, Peachey and Perry argue how this particular economic borderland in
Southeast Asia is a reflection of fragmented integration against the global economy
because the surrounding environments of the flagship projects which took place saw
limited progress and success.20 By carrying out grounded research, borderlands

Page 5 of 28

scholarship examines processes that include analysis of top-down perspectives, but also
incorporate many individual border narratives and experiences.21 However, there appear
to be two angles that do require more research attention. First, research tends to skirt
around anticipatory geographies’ on economic borderlands (with Matt Sparke’s work an
exception to the rule22) and borders’ issues at large, which limits the potential to be
critically informative to contemporary and future (re)development projects affecting the
economic frontiers. Second, anticipatory geographies leads to considerations of future
transnational cross-border geopolitical relationships between the border towns, external
actor(s), and the requisite state agencies involved.
Next, borders with their material meanings and practices tend to be interpreted
and represented as ‘windows’ offering views onto the world’s geopolitics, or are part of
the geopolitics themselves.23 However, if borders are to be more connected with
geopolitics, we need to arm ourselves with relational geographies and broader regional
ties. As Massey persuasively argues, places must be thought more as routes rather than
roots.24 Borders are places that witness movement of people, investment and goods.
Borders are not inflexible, static venues where there is no related connection to other
places. This is especially true in the case of the Thai-Lao border and China, two areas
enthusiastically promoted by the ADB as a region of competitiveness and connectivity in
the GMS.25 Although earlier works by Walker and Hill have acknowledged the existence
of Chinese merchants in the history of trade exchanges with mainland Southeast Asia
through caravans and river trading in the Mekong River26, the intensity of exchanges now
will be greatly increased with the upcoming bridge. The proposed bridge in its material
form will bring even more people and goods across Thailand to Laos and vice versa, and
its interpretations and representations go more than just the two towns of Chiang Khong
and Houay Xay. In reality, it must be remembered that the bridge is half-funded by
China, and perceived to bring more Chinese people, investment and goods into the ThaiLao border. The proposed bridge in the GMS’s economic borderland is physically
between Thailand and Laos, but speaks of wider relational geographies with external
actor(s), specifically China. Thus, the proposed bridge finds itself appropriated as a
metaphor for the wider trajectory of anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations27
between the Thai-Lao border and China.
GEO-BODIES, UPPER MEKONG BORDERLANDS AND RIVERSCAPE
The geographical imaginary of the GMS is relatively new, but regional trade links along
and across the Mekong have connected the borderlands with distant places for centuries.
Our focus in on a present-day bridge development and anticipatory geographies, but it is
necessary to contextualize current developments within a deeper historical-temporal
geographical context. The upper-Mekong region has a long history of spatial competition
over the control of trade routes, strategic natural resources, and cross-river connections.28
Furthermore, the ‘upper-Mekong communities have had longstanding experience of
managing uneven and unequal connections with other places’.29 However, the current
regionalization processes symbolized by the bridge may lead to intensified processes of
uneven development within the contemporary borderlands, as local authorities and people
have to deal with new central state regulation, trade agreements, public-private sector
involvement dominated by national cores, and transnational capital investments.30
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Looking at the past indicates that we should be cautious in our projections about
anticipatory geographies, geopolitics and geo-economics. For the upper-Mekong
borderlands should not be viewed purely from a center-periphery perspective as rural,
isolated backwaters, distant from national power domains, and easily exploited by
external interests. Prior to the creation of the fixed river boundary now delineating Laos
and Thailand, there existed in the 19th century a Nan trans-Mekong tributary state within
which Chiang Khong was a highly strategic cross-river outpost, controlling tolls and
taxes on river trade, ferry services across and down river, as well as trans-“Golden
Triangle”31 caravan traffic from China into the Mekong heartlands.32 Chiang Khong
served as a vital port between Nan, the Lanna Kingdom (northern Thailand) and and
Luang Prabang (in current-day Laos).
Imposing territorial ‘geo-bodies’ in the Mekong region, particularly between the
Siamese and former French colonial authorities, was often a ‘violent’ business in several
areas where surveying and mapping was usually backed up by military force.33 The
conceptualization of ‘geo-body’ owes much to Robert Sack’s theory of human
territoriality34, although Thongchai applies the notion to an historical examination of
modern political geography in the making of Siam as a bounded nation.35 By the end of
the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, the Siamese authorities were just as
capable and eager as their European rivals, Britain and France, to settle ‘ambiguous
space.’ ‘The power of the new geographical knowledge exercised by both the Siamese
and the French forces prevailed and created a new kind of space’.36 However, there were
many areas where the Siamese and the French were uncertain where to place the political
‘interface’ between the emerging geo-bodies. Attempts to delimit new spheres of
undiluted sovereignty was not a project that could be completed neatly by delineating
boundaries, because places on ‘either side’ had previously enjoyed looser non-territorial
forms of political tribute and allegiance, often to more than one overlord, and the people
viewed the river-space as a uniting rather than a dividing one. Furthermore, the French
colonial authorities failed to fully bring the upper-Mekong territories under their full
administrative control. ‘Boundaries were re-drawn, but the French were unable to
translate the discursive power of colonial maps into a new regulatory regime’.37 Until the
present-day, cross-border and intra-regional ties have flourished, and it is ‘connectedness’
and inseparable ties between ‘local’ and ‘non-local’ power that characterize this part of
the upper-Mekong borderlands more than relative ‘isolation’38 and exploitative relations
with ‘external’ forces.
Political geo-bodies are definitely not the only way to conceptualize socio-spatial
relations. Daily trans-river and down-river traffic, as well as trans-frontier social and
blood ties, help to mould a distinctive cultural riverscape. Whilst the coming of modern
political geography enabled the Mekong River to be divided by international boundaries
along several long stretches of its course, thus partially displacing ‘indigenous tributary
space’ with new ‘geo-bodies’39, it could not wipe clean the sense of ‘cultural community’
along many stretches of Siam – Laos border.40 Kinship and cultural ties forged over
centuries in the era before international boundaries, did not completely vanish, although
relations adapted over time as a result of central state nation-building, various forms of
state regulation of border crossing-points, taxation, and so on.
The boundary in the Mekong River became ‘one of the best (or worst) examples
of the non-conformity of political borders to ethnic distributions’ for there were nine
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times as many ethnic Laotians in Thailand than there were in Laos. People ‘share the
river’, its ways of life, and through intermarriage and kin relations people have contacts
across river, and they also share a social calendar with key Buddhist ceremonies and river
festivals uniting both sides. These relations and exchanges are cultural, not geopolitical,
and arise from a strong ‘family feeling or kinship rather than any particular associations
with governments or states.’ Thus, Mekong River- border-scapes are akin to close-knit
cross-border ‘neighbourhoods.’ The river itself has become a common space that
frequently subverts the notion of rigid and fixed geo-bodies, as fishers from each side of
the river often meet on the rocks, reefs and sand-bars within the river, and there are daily
localized trans-border transgressions of the actual boundary.41
Social ‘relations’ have transformed local people’s views of the river and border.
From an anthropological perspective: ‘The “border riverscape” entails relations and
perceptions toward a particular location where the porosity of border and fluidity of river
coincide. The ‘scape’ of each agency is derived from, and shaped by, its vista,
impression, interactions, and meanings given to the space and situated in the matrix of
relations’ of agencies on both sides in relation to those using the river.42 As in other parts
of the Mekong, ‘people come and go easily’ across the border, ‘they cross to visit, to
socialize, to consult, to worship and to work.’ School children from the Lao side cross the
river to attend classes on the Thai side. Lao women traders regularly sell goods in the
Chiang Khong market. Thais often purchase consumer goods from the ‘Chinese market’
in Chiang Khong. These are some of the multiple, everyday and banal forms of mobility
and exchange across and within the river, which are considered normal by border
residents, incorporating regulated and unregulated forms of activity. They represent some
of the myriad ways in which local agencies and agents recognize, negotiate, transgress,
and transcend national geo-bodies.
In fact the presence of Chinese traders has a long history associated with caravan
routes and river traffic, including long-standing Chinese settlements in some parts of
north-western Laos and northern Thailand. Thus, the current GMS initiatives are
unremarkable in terms of historical Chinese mobility, trade and settlement, but may prove
more disruptive within the border region insofar as distant Chinese and highly mobile
transnational capital are the prime movers and economic beneficiaries of the bridge,
highway and associated investments. Indeed, from sub-national trans-border perspectives,
the development of a new transnational bridge is not vital to economic integration. Local
people have numerous long-established and binding social, economic and cultural ties
that transcend centralized notions of sovereign geo-bodies. In effect, the new bridge
project is part of a much bigger scale geo-economic geographical GMS imaginary,
supported by national governments, aided by the ADB, and strongly spearheaded by
Chinese investments. This geo-imaginary builds on an earlier geometric imaginary of ‘the
Economic Quadrangle’ (a vast cross-regional border zone encompassing parts of China,
Myanmar, Laos and Thailand mentioned in the introduction), pushed by regional
entrepreneurs, development-planners of key state ministries (trade, energy and transport
in particular), investors, business associations, and backed by the ADB (see Figure 1). It
is more relevant for us to consider how these regional goals, and the bridge that links
Chiang Rai Province by road to Southwest China, is going to affect the borderlands,
disrupt the older local and non-local connections, and transform aspects of the riverscape
and cross-border river life in future.
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GROUNDED POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES
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Adopting grounded field-based political geography research can yield much about the
dynamics of multi-scalar regionalization through an in-depth examination of particular
prestige projects such as trans-border bridges. Uncovering local voices about a major
trans-border project is arguably able to shed light on a range of issues that link the subnational trans-national scale with bigger issues of regionalization, uneven development,
and geopolitical relations between participating agencies, particularly the three states
involved in this particular GMS project.
First, the local perceptions of the proposed bridge at the Thai-Lao border of
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay will be highlighted. By local perceptions, we mean those
people living in the two towns, not necessarily in the sense they have to be pure Thai or
Laotian. Our research stems from an initial fieldwork conducted December 2010 and
January 2011 by the first author, and most recently by a follow-up research by the second
author in January 2012. Even though we have a basic understanding of the Thai
language43, a translator helped the author(s) during fieldwork so as to prevent
misinterpretations. A total of twenty-four individuals (thirteen in Thailand and eleven in
Laos) were interviewed. As for our choice of interviewees, we have chosen people on
both sides of the border that are likely to be affected by the upcoming bridge in terms of
earnings and livelihood. These include individuals, who work at the construction sites
and river ports, owners of restaurants, guesthouses, travel agencies and shops that sell
household items, villagers who stay close to the proposed bridge, and one who is part of
an environmental group (Rak Chiang Khong) that seeks to preserve and protect the
Mekong River’s ecosystem. Rak Chiang Khong are a locally significant environmental
lobby group, and by interviewing someone from there is not merely soliciting ‘antibridge’ sentiments, but aimed to get a cross-section of differing opinions from local
stakeholders. Focusing on these borderland perspectives is central in a part of the upper
Mekong region where there are numerous transnational cross-border activities involving
Chinese who move across the Chinese border and reside in Laos or Thailand. It is our
intention to uncover various borderland viewpoints about the trans-border bridge which is
envisaged as one catalyst of grandiose regional infrastructure integration schemes likely
to benefit metropolitan centres of power more than the towns most directly involved.
Second, the local perceptions of the proposed bridge provide clues concerning
anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao borderlands and
China. Our research in two strategic GMS border towns has tried to add localized
‘voices’, visions, and viewpoints to an understanding of larger scale processes that are
driving the whole GMS concept. Subnational borderland perspective often diverge from
dominant GMS regional and state-centred discourses, or at least provide local knowledge
of actual and potential consequences of specific GMS projects. Hence, research within
Chiang Khong and Houay Xai sheds more light on real and imagined geographies
relating to specific cross-border infrastructure projects, which also have geopolitical
ramifications. The analysis that follows relates to our field research in the borderland.

ly

On
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ANTICIPATING THE CHINESE PRESENCE
With China’s growing financial clout and assiduously pursued economic relations
undertaken with Thailand and Laos, the proposed bridge must be read more than just a
Chinese investment. The Thai – China FTA makes this bridge ‘a high priority site, and
perhaps most significant, are the growing interests of China as well as Chinese businesses
moving into the area’.44 The bridge acts as springboard to speed up exports of Chinese
goods into mainland Southeast Asia and spur Chinese migrants to seek economic
opportunities south of Yunnan. Having said this, the increasing Chinese presence
represents a complex mix of problems and opportunities, which will play out distinctly
for different sectors, in different countries and between different actors.45 Hence, this
particular section reviews the current concerns of the people living in Chiang Khong and
Houay Xay regarding the future bridge and the increasing Chinese presence in terms of
economic competition for livelihood and goods, and unpacks very different responses
from both sides of the border. The analysis of the empirical data thus facilitates the
understanding of the anticipatory transnational cross-border geopolitical ties between the
Thai-Lao border and China.
Thai import-export ferry operators interviewed expressed concerns that they
might have to shift their businesses to the bridge in future, which present a different
working environment.46 The worries shared by the Thai import-export ferry operators are
not surprising, considering that the proposed bridge offers a direct alternative to river
transport. However, we should not just be concerned with the infrastructural impact of
the bridge. With the proposed bridge acting as a symbolic piece of infrastructure to
connect the Chinese, Lao and Thai economies closer, perceptions on the Chinese capital
that funds half of it generates more insights to the anticipatory geopolitical relations
between the Thai-Lao border and China. As we interviewed people in Chiang Khong on
the representations of Chinese investment via the bridge, opinions from a villager and a
tour agent respectively reflect a wary view on the impending increased Chinese presence
and a pessimistic outlook on their economic livelihood:
The Chinese are rich. They have the money to invest, and can look for local
businessmen to partner and buy our land. Poor people like me can only be
employees.47
Now you can see more and more Chinese touring, exchanging currency and
shopping here. I see them as prospective investors in Chiang Khong and Chiang Rai,
but I don’t think it may be good for us. I don’t foresee an equal sharing of benefits.48

On the other hand, the Chinese presence across the border in Houay Xai provides a
glimpse of an optimistic outlook as a construction worker, opines:
The bridge project was looking for people to provide labour, so I’m happy I got a
job. The Chinese company pays me quite well so I can support my family better
with this income.49
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His sentiment was echoed by a few others who agreed to his assessment. However, we
learnt of something the Laotians may be unaware of. A Chinese surveyor at the
construction site shared with us the reason why the Chinese company employs Laotians:
We help them to build the bridge but the Lao government states that we have to use
Laotian labour for most construction workers. Only those in planning positions can
be Chinese. It’s legal so we have to follow.50

In this sense, the Laotian construction workers’ satisfied feelings may not last long as
once the bridge is completed, they have to seek jobs elsewhere. Also, as mentioned in a
newspaper report,
One telling example is the thousands of Chinese who have come to work on the
Asian Development Bank-funded Route 3 in northern Laos that runs from the
Chinese border, through the Lao town of Luang Nam Tha, and down to the Thai
border. Many of the workers have stayed on and opened shops or found other work
after their construction contracts ended.51

Hence, the Chinese construction workers of this bridge project may similarly choose to
stay on and compete with the locals for jobs in the future.
The anticipation of the Chinese presence also translates into the topic of Chinese
goods. As a newspaper account and an interview demonstrate:
The politicians responsible for bulldozing these ideas into practice should visit
Chiang Saen or Chiang Khong on the Mekong River and count the number of
heavily laden barges arriving from China on an hourly basis. Cheap goods and fruit
unloaded from these boats give little comfort to our farmers and manufacturers,
many of whom simply cannot compete.52
The bridge means Chinese goods will arrive faster in Thailand. It is just a matter of
hours. The bridge will be well connected to other roads. Traders don’t need to use
the boats which are slower and have to depend on the water level in the Mekong…
Thailand exports fruits mainly to China… China, they export almost everything.53

Whether via the river or the proposed bridge, the view on having Chinese goods on Thai
soil does not seem to go down well with the local Thais. With the signing of the
Thailand-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2003, trade frictions occur frequently
over agricultural produce.54 In particular, the severely dampened prices of Thai garlic to
as low as 17 baht per kilogram in 2008 caused by smuggled Chinese garlic saw the Thai
government moving in to place garlic on a list of goods with state controlled prices.55 As
such, Chinese goods are seen as direct competition in Thailand, and the bridge is
imagined to exacerbate the situation in future. Already, many Chinese manufactured
goods are sold in border markets, not only in Houay Xay, but also in Tachilek a bustling
border town of Myanmar, opposite the ‘sister city’ of Mae Sai, Chiang Rai Province.
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Over in Houay Xay, a different scenario emerges as far as attitudes to the
increasing Chinese commercial presence are concerned. Through interviews with the
locals, it seems that Chinese goods are welcomed:
There is a Chinese market about 4km away from the town. There are many different
items on sale and they are cheap.56
I like to use Chinese products. My motorcycle is from China. Laos does not produce
its own motorcycles.57

Their comments are supported by a Chinese wholesaler working in the Chinese market
whom remarked that Chinese products are cheap and are quite good in quality, also
offering Laotians something which their country does not produce for them.58 The
differing sentiments in Houay Xay as compared to Chiang Khong are most likely to be
attributed to the fact that Laos does not produce many consumer goods on its own, and
thus Chinese goods are seen as value for money purchases.
Following Power and Mohan59, we concur that China’s growing economic
strength means that it is unlikely to have a partnership of equals with Laos and Thailand.
This particular bridge in construction is an exemplar of how China’s growing strength is
perceived on the ground at Chiang Khong and Houay Xay in current concerns and future
imaginaries. Our fieldwork has uncovered the pressing need to consider local voices from
the borders because these voices encompass something of an ‘anti-geopolitical eye’60 that
counters the dominant geopolitical scripts of China’s rise, such as Robert Kaplan’s
remark in the influential Foreign Affairs magazine that ‘it is with relatively weak states of
Southeast Asia that the emergence of a Greater China is meeting the least resistance’.61
We should remember that grounded realties are more diverse and complex.
Undoubtedly, Chinese bilateral investments, aid and trade with each of the Lower
Mekong countries have tended towards state-centered emphases on economic relations
and national goals without critical examination of regional social and environmental
costs, such as in relation to unilateral upper mainstream hydropower developments
already underway along the Lancang, China’s name for the Mekong River.62 However,
Kaplan’s simplifications miss multiple forms of resistance within those states to some of
China’s regional aims. For instance, China’s plans to turn the upper Mekong mainstream
into a super highway for trade through a navigational channel improvement project, first
mooted in the early 1990s, and officially started in April 200063, also entailed that reefs
and rocks in sections of the river between China and Luang Prabang in Laos must be
blasted away by dynamite. However, this grandiose navigation project was only partially
successful, for local Thai opposition groups, supported by national and regional NGOs,
campaigned against the damage the reef blasting would do to livelihoods, fisheries and
biodiversity.64 Eventually, the Thai Ministry of Defense opposed blasting in the Thai-Lao
zone due to unresolved positional boundary issues65, but the voices of groups such as Rak
Chiang Khong66 continue to reverberate through the Lower Mekong.
Thus, the ‘least resistance’ from Southeast Asia as suggested may not materialize,
and Chiang Khong and Houay Xay may resent China’s growing clout. Although the
interviews revealed only worries and frustrations in Chiang Khong and a welcoming
attitude in Houay Xay to the impending Chinese presence, worries may escalate (Chiang
Khong) or joy could be short-lived (Houay Xay) in the future. As David Ley notes,
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‘flows of migrants follow paths of economic opportunity’67, the economic borderland of
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay are imagined as future ‘economic boom’ towns with the
bridge acting as a ‘magnet’ to attract even more Chinese capital and citizens. Competition
from increasing quantities of cheap Chinese goods coming through the future bridge
could easily trigger even more outbursts in Chiang Khong. In Houay Xay, if the Chinese
presence increases and reaches a level like that in Boten68 (see Figure 2) where the
Chinese dominate the local economy69, cheap Chinese goods may not sound pleasing to
Laotian ears anymore if most job opportunities go to the Chinese.
While strong social movements acting as anti-geopolitical measures70 may not
surface in time, we cannot discount other manifestations of resistance, such as small
protests that sow practical alternatives for a life beyond the Chinese presence. Hence, the
concerns expressed in our work and any form of future resistance would then be telling
clues on the anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao border
and China, where geopolitical ties could be strained due to persistent geoeconomic
inequalities and the uneasiness of having so many Chinese migrants at Chiang Khong and
Houay Xay. The expected strains on geopolitical relations are perhaps far off from
triggering a border war, but certainly put Thais and Laotians in a heightened state of
worry about everyday life concerns.
ANTICIPATING THE THAI AND LAO CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
Everyone looks at the opportunity. It’s not China alone. Thailand and Laos want the
bridge too. If there are potential benefits for them, any government would want the
bridge.71

In the economic borderland of the GMS, Thailand and Laos are seeking to have a share
of the trading pie along with ‘massive’ China. It is in this opportunistic sense that
Thailand has promoted the internationalization of capital, and became more
internationalized72, and Laos inviting foreign aid to pursue infrastructure projects.73 Thus,
it is also critical to engage the imaginaries of the Thai and Lao central governments
towards the proposed bridge. This is required as Thailand and Laos have their own
political and economic policies to implement through the bridge. In particular, Thailand’s
usage of the term ‘Gateway to Indochina’ for Chiang Khong is investigated on whether it
strikes a chord with the people living in the border town (see Figure 4).74 As Kuus rightly
points out, we should take note not only of what the states say in their content of
arguments, but also the context of delivery and process of the arguments’ production.75
With these reminders taken note, we seek to uncover how the policies undertaken by
Thailand and Laos to compete with China for the benefits of the proposed bridge
influence the anticipatory transnational cross-border geopolitical relationship between the
Thai-Lao border and China in two angles, which are the clash of imaginaries and the
purchase of farmland near the bridge.
***********
Figure 4 here, Caption: Chiang Khong is the Place to Invest in
***********
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While the construction of the proposed bridge at Chiang Khong and Houay Xay
started recently, the plans and visions for the bridge were brought up about two decades
ago. Andrew Walker notes that in the 1990s, Thailand and Laos conceptualized the idea
of having a bridge and surrounding roads paved to improve trade links with Yunnan
province of China.76 However, it is in the last few years that the bridge idea started to
materialize as affordability was a main deterrence in the 1990s. Now aided with Chinese
funding for at least half the bridge’s cost, high hopes are pinned on it to propel Chiang
Khong and Houay Xay into prosperity, as illustrated in the notion of it being a ‘Golden
Gate to Indochina’ (see Figure 3). The prosperity belief is echoed by an engineer who is
employed by the Thai central government to the bridge’s construction:
I think this bridge will attract more development for Chiang Khong and Houay Xay.
It is definitely a ‘Gateway to Indochina’.77

The issues highlighted here speak of the respective Thai and Laos governments’ beliefs
and aims to give China a run for its own money and claim their own spatial imaginary
desires via the bridge project.
However, the states’ visionaries are not matched at the borders:
Chiang Khong,
The bridge is being built according to the city’s motto of being the ‘Gateway to
Indochina’. It is not a ‘Chiang Khong People’s Bridge’. The construction company
is a big government company that wants to earn money through the bridge.78

Houay Xay,
There will be a spa resort and a hotel built near the bridge. But I don’t think many
people in Houay Xay can afford to use the facilities.79

These comments underscore serious considerations raised by some excluded
‘voices’ from the border towns. While the Thai and Lao central governments have their
own ideas to promote trade links with China through the proposed bridge, their actions
result in disagreements of policies, and even place worries for the people who live in
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay in terms of the anticipatory geographies uncovered. In
particular, the next sub-section looks at the land acquisition carried out by both
governments which will influence the cross-border ties with China in future.
Also, in their bids to capitalize on the anticipatory geographies of wealth and
prosperity through the proposed bridge, the Lao and Thai governments have started to
acquire significant plots of land from the villagers near the bridge at Baan Vieng May and
Baan Don Mahawan in Houay Xay and Chiang Khong respectively. These two villages
are where the proposed bridge is constructed at both ends and are approximately ten km
away from the towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay. Specifically, the lands that have
been acquired from the villagers on both sides of the border are mostly farmland and are
seen as future ‘goldmines’ by the central governments. It has also been revealed through
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the interviews that Chinese businessmen are subsequent buyers and/or leaseholders of
several plots of land acquired by the governments from the people living in Chiang
Khong and Houay Xay. These collective land sale transactions drew unhappy responses:
Chiang Khong,
I can see the price of land increasing. This is especially so in the land close to the
bridge. It can cost up to 1 million over baht per rai.80 The government buys up the
land. I also heard Chinese businessmen bought land in Chiang Khong through their
Thai partners.81
You see the land over there? The village people own it last time. Now the
government bought up all already. The government compensated us 300,000 to
400,000 baht per rai. This place will look so different next time.82

Houay Xay,
The Lao government took back some of the village’s land for development. They
gave us compensation but it’s very low. We asked for more compensation but it is
not allowed. We cannot do anything about it, so we just sell to the government.83
The government said land must be acquired to widen roads… I think our agricultural
land is going to be leased to foreigners, like the Chinese and maybe Thais too.84

The land issue is particularly sensitive to villagers, and their expressed discontent
towards their governments is mainly due to the insufficient compensation. Things get
more complex when subsequent land sale and lease transactions are concluded with the
Chinese, such as one example where the Lao government has awarded a group of
Chinese investors a concession to lease and develop a plot of land covering about 5,169
rai into a major trade and tourism complex.85 Another example goes deeper in Thailand,
where ‘Chinese merchants often marry people of Thai nationality, and purchase Thai real
estate, including agricultural land; the produce is then exported back to China’.86 As
another updated fieldwork interview in early 2012 reinforces that the bridge development
may actually have little impact on local borderland businesses, a Chiang Khong
entrepreneur who runs a business selling precious and unusual rocks from the river,
commented that: ‘this is not “pattanaa (development) Chiang Khong or Houay Xai”, this
is “pattanaa GMS and Asia”’.87 He observes that land has already been bought at very
cheap prices in the vicinity of the bridge, mostly by Bangkok-based and Chinese
concerns, and since then land prices are sky-rocketing near the bridge zone. He also
suggested that Highway 3 and the proposed future rail link would largely benefit China,
Yunnan and distant Bangkok, Lampang and Chiang Mai more than the people in the
borderlands. This is a common local viewpoint and one that resonates with the notion of
‘scale-jumping’ and uneven development processes relating to the larger regionalization
associated with the GMS.
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In this empirical section, we highlighted the clashes of imaginaries and expectations of
the of the proposed bridge over at the border towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay
between the central governments and the people living in the border towns. Critical
geopolitics is pertinent to study the reasons of the clashes. Oftentimes, ‘the media and
politicians are storytellers- and in order for their stories to be accepted by their audience
they have to resonate with meta-level hegemonic cultural values’.88 Both the Lao and
Thai central governments sought the people in the border towns for backing in the form
of conceptualizing complex geopolitical and geoeconomic issues with China for the share
of the growing wealth in the GMS, and make them comprehensible to the people through
the power of discourses such as the ‘Gateway to Indochina’. But in the context of the Lao
and Thai central governments, their ‘stories’ of ‘Gateway to Indochina’ and promised
prosperity are not envisaged by most of the people (especially villagers) living in Houay
Xay and Chiang Khong. More broadly, the failure reflects the need to ‘create a public
political culture that demands, requires and values grounded geographical knowledge
over geopolitical sloganizing’.89
Specifically, the land conflict issues arising through the anticipatory geographies
in Chiang Khong and Houay Xay are raised with great urgency, as the need to match the
development projects of flagship projects with the improvement of their surrounding
environments tend to expose future disputes between the public and the state.90 We stress
this not merely as an attempt to ‘identify with the marginal such as the villagers as the
border’s development may be the project of those seeking to gain further advantage in
society: entrepreneurs or affluent citizens, for example’.91 With capital from Bangkok and
Vientiane flowing in to buy the land near the proposed bridge, any increase in land sales
and leases to the Chinese businessmen over time are likely to stoke anti-Chinese
sentiments among the poor villagers. As we have stated in the previous section, the
increasing Chinese presence of migrants and cheap goods are already causing a degree of
anxious concerns. The land conflict issues could easily worsen the situation and dampen
interest to engage the Chinese in the border towns, because of the questioning of the
immense political and economic competiveness posed by the Chinese. In worse
scenarios, violent acts against Chinese migrants cannot be ruled out. In short, the
anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relationship between the Thai-Lao border and
China also hinges upon the policies pushed by the Thai and Lao central governments, and
cannot be studied solely from the angle of a rising China trying to exercise influence in
the GMS.
WHO BENEFITS MORE WITH CHINA? A BRIDGE THAT CONNECTS AND
DIVIDES CHIANG KHONG AND HOUAY XAY

China has replaced Thailand as the biggest foreign investor in Laos for the
first time in five years… Thailand was the top investor in Laos from 2005 to
2009 before losing the position to China due to a rapid increase in Chinese
investment over the first two quarters of this year. Chinese companies have
decided to invest in 16 projects with a total value of US$344 million over the
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past six months, while Thai firms decided to invest in only 4 projects worth
just US$3.7 million over the same period.92
The above quote reflects a new geoeconomic reality in the economic (re)development of
Laos. Thailand had been the traditional country to lead economic development in Laos
until after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, where a weakened Thailand left Laos
to embrace an emerging China in attracting much needed investments to its poor
economy.93 In a similar vein, the proposed bridge mirrors the new geoeconomic reality as
well. Although China and Thailand each shares half of the cost for the mega
infrastructure project, China’s relatively much stronger economic prowess propels itself
ahead of Thailand to expand its footprint in Laos. The acknowledgment of this new
geoeconomic reality is clearly salient, as cross-border ties between Chiang Khong and
Houay Xay are progressively more influenced by China. For example, people in Chiang
Khong may feel Houay Xay will gain more with China through the bridge given the
closer proximity to the Chinese border. As such, perceptions on which side of the border
benefits more through the bridge with China in time matters in influencing the overall
anticipatory geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao border and China.
People living in Chiang Khong are aware that even though with the construction of
bridge, Thailand still does not share a border with China, hence the interviews elicited a
tinge of ‘jealousy’ towards Houay Xay:
Laos shares a direct border with China. Laos has also so many new improved roads
from Houay Xay to Yunnan. All these improvements are done with Chinese help.94
I think Chiang Khong will not benefit much from China. There should be more
Chinese businessmen in Laos. Laos is closer to them. It is easier for them to do
business there.95

Although their views may not be wholly representative of Chiang Khong, the thoughts
expressed suggest they perceive Houay Xay will benefit more with China through the
bridge. Lintner also observes that Laos is becoming more land-linked through roads and
rail to other neighbouring countries despite being a land-locked country96, which support
the perceptions of the two interview quotes that Houay Xay will get closer to China in
trade links.
While there are claims that Houay Xay will benefit more than Chiang Khong with
China through the future bridge, ‘voices’ from the Lao side of the border offer alternate
perspectives:
Houay Xay is just a transit town where Chinese goods come through here to go
Thailand, and Thai goods pass here to go Yunnan.97
The bridge will bring more people to Houay Xay. But they won’t stay here for long.
Tourists will leave soon after one to two days. They will go to Luang Prabang They
will go to China or return to Chiang Khong. Houay Xay will still be very much a
transit town even when the bridge is completed. We don’t have many attractions like
Luang Prabang.98
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The idea of Houay Xay as a transit town is evident in the minds of the people living
there. First, the transit perception is perhaps justified by the fact that China last year
became Thailand's top export destination, replacing the United States, as it imported 11%
of all Thai exports.99 Houay Xay is the town to pass through for Thai goods taken to
Yunnan on road after crossing the Mekong River on ferry. Second, Houay Xay is the
second preferred choice after Vientiane to set off tour visits to Luang Prabang via the
slow boat services.100
These underlying thoughts are telling signs that the proposed bridge is not spared
from the dynamics of rivalry shared by Chiang Khong and Houay Xay in the cross-border
geopolitical relationship with China. The concerns are to be taken note in relation to the
rising geoeconomic clout posed by China, because each side of the border perceives the
other as the party that will benefit more with China in terms of economic development.
The value of geoeconomics as an analytical framework proves valuable in examining the
underlying tensions as it is concerned with the geographical distribution of wealth,
drawing links between economic flows and the national/border economies of China,
Chiang Khong and Houay Xay. Geoeconomics manipulates the imaginaries of future
visionaries of prosperity because people at the Thai-Lao border have different
expectations of what the bridge can offer to the towns of Chiang Khong and Houay Xay.
In addition, the anticipatory geographies uncovered in Chiang Khong and Houay Xay
reflects the geoeconomic conceptions of space, power and security as relational to an
external party (China). In this sense, geopolitics is recalibrated by market logics101, and
the geopolitical relationship between the Thai-Lao border and China hinges on the
dynamics of geoeconomics.
Economic (re)development projects at the borderland could represent a perfidious
impediment for prosperity or a tantalizing window of opportunity at one or both side(s) of
the border. The bridge as symbolized by China’s immense financial clout sensationalizes
the perceptions of impediment and opportunities among the people living in Chiang
Khong and Houay Xay as in who gains more or less across the Mekong River. It is a
bridge that will connect the towns closer and faster physically and yet can divide them
culturally and politically in future economic development with China.
AN ANTICIPATORY CONCLUSION: TAKING HEED OF LOCAL ‘VOICES’
AND BORDERLAND TRANSFORMATIONS
Indeed, a bridge links local communities, but also articulates with and makes
movement possible between far distant ones.102
The changeable nature of cross-border spaces suggests that to some degree they are
based on “imaginary” spaces envisioned by politicians.103
Geoeconomic visionaries tend as a result to anticipate capitalist inclusion rather than
the expulsion or containment of others. Their focus is on networks not blocs,
connections not walls, and transborder ties instead of national territories.104
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The above quotes capture and summarize our purpose of uncovering the anticipatory
geographies surrounding the proposed bridge at the Thai-Lao border towns of Chiang
Khong and Houay Xay we expounded in our article. The three quotes suggest imaginaries
of connectivity that promise hope through the eyes of the central governments. These
include closer foreign ties, increased wealth and improved infrastructure through the
proposed bridge in our empirical study of the three countries (China, Laos and Thailand).
However, hope is not envisioned the same way at the border towns. The three
empirical sections have underscored the need to listen to local perceptions at the ThaiLao border as they signal potential ill- feelings that could translate into discriminatory
practices or even violence towards Chinese migrants in future. The detrimental effects
would then jeopardize future cross-border geopolitical ties and trade between the ThaiLao border and China. Having said that, we have also shown how grounded research
carried out exclusively at borders are often and perhaps too emphasized on the affairs of
the two countries that share the political boundary, missing out on how a third country
can influence border relations between the first two states.
A further possible relevance and contribution of our article is on a policy level.
Following Anderson’s urges to take anticipatory practices seriously105, such as scenario
planning, preparedness and preemption, we seek to push the anticipatory geographies
presented in our research to provide urgency for anticipatory practices to be drafted by
China, Laos, Thailand and even ADB to counter any resentment towards growing
disparities among the border towns and Yunnan through the proposed bridge. In
particular, our work pushes critical geopolitics to be more policy relevant instead of
becoming an academic fad.106
We recognize that the data collected and the conclusions reached are context-based
and are by no means representative of the entire spectrum of views in Chiang Khong and
Houay Xay. Nevertheless, we want to stress certain anticipatory geographies that are
likely to influence future cross-border geopolitical relations. This is especially important
in the area of our research. First, ‘ADB officials recognize that the projects they fund are
likely to encourage further socio-spatial unevenness, but they state that there is no other
viable way they know of to develop the GMS’s basic infrastructure’.107 Second, in a
recent road trip taken by the foreign ministers of the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) from Chiang Rai to Jinghong in Yunnan, the politicians are even more
eager to explore greater connectivity through road and rail in the GMS with China and
even India.108 Thus, there already exists a powerful political economic juggernaut based
on certain shared regional geoeconomic imaginaries fostered by various cross-border
infrastructure projects.
The two reasons clearly suggest that future research must engage anticipatory
geographies more than ever, and to create anticipatory practices. As Jim Glassman
eloquently puts it:
The GMS might bring greater peace and prosperity to peoples throughout Southeast
Asia; it might also generate new conflicts that reflect the interests of some of the
major actors pushing regionalization and globalization.109

For example, China’s upstream projects along the Mekong have generated multiple
conflicts of interest, anxieties and coalitions challenging certain hydro-power
developments, which could create serious intra-regional and inter-state tensions in
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future.110 In this paper we have focused on a new cross-border bridge that is less
controversial than the contested waterscapes of the Mekong, but even so, there are
numerous unintended and potentially contentious issues that are likely to arise. Certainly
the bridge is already harbinger of socio-economic and political changes, including an
Chinese presence; investors from Kunming, Bangkok, Chiang Mai and Vientiane;
transnational capitalizing on cross-border and riverside land development; and increasing
local awareness of “pattana (development) GMS” . Then the crucial take home message
here is to listen to the local ‘voices’ at the economic borderland because the actual
geographies happening within the borderland now are visions and a portent into the
anticipatory future.
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